Henry Huiyao Wang Speaks with Chosun Ilbo on Northeast Asia
August 26 , 2025In an interview with South Korea’s largest daily newspaper, the CCG founder reflects on China-U.S. relations, South Korea’s strategic choices, and the promise of regional integration.
On August 12, 2025, Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder & President of the Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG), gave an interview to Lee Bal-zan, Beijing Bureau Chief and Special Correspondent of the Chosun Ilbo, South Korea’s largest daily newspaper. Their discussion examined the transformations in Northeast Asia over the past eight decades, during which Wang shared his perspectives on China’s role in reshaping the international order and on broader trends in global development.
Founded in 1920 and headquartered in Seoul, the Chosun Ilbo is South Korea’s oldest and most widely circulated daily newspaper. This interview formed a central part of the paper’s special series marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and was featured in its dedicated China section. The piece appeared both in print and on the newspaper’s official website.
The interview was conducted in Chinese, and the Chinese transcript remains available on CCG’s official Website. The English translation of the transcript presented here has not been reviewed by either of the speakers.
Part 1. U.S.-China Relations and the Global Order
Lee Bal-zan: You are now one of the most prominent experts on U.S.-China relations. How should we assess the current easing of tensions between the two countries? For example, today it was announced that the U.S. and China have extended their tariff “truce period” by 90 days. How do you view the overall situation?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I believe U.S.-China relations are essentially a relationship of interdependence and shared prosperity. Over the past eight years, spanning Donald Trump’s first and current presidential terms, through continued engagement with China and multiple rounds of trade war manoeuvring, the U.S. has come to fully recognise a reality long understood in China: “I am in you and you are in me.” In truth, it is very difficult to separate the two.
That is why I think Trump has adopted a more pragmatic approach this time. He agreed with China to extend the suspension of tariff measures. Whether in Geneva, where talks pushed for tariff reductions, in London, where both sides sought to maintain the status quo and clarify differences, or in Stockholm, where the latest discussions were held, this trend has been evident. Today’s announcement of a further 90-day extension of the tariff truce likely serves to create room for a leaders’ summit, enabling further progress in the three months ahead.
My view stems from China’s unique position. In America’s dealings with major global trading partners and economies, China’s advantages and weight are increasingly pronounced. Within global supply chains, China plays a pivotal role: 80 per cent of iPhones are produced in China; half of Tesla’s electric vehicles are manufactured there; and a significant share of auto parts, particularly those needed by U.S. companies, also comes from Chinese suppliers. Beyond this, China holds irreplaceable importance in strategic resources such as rare earths.
Therefore, if the U.S. continues to stoke trade wars in these areas, it no longer holds the same leverage as before. A better approach is for both sides to sit down and negotiate, identify complementarities, and strike a balance. For instance, China can step up purchases of U.S. agricultural products, especially soybeans. As Trump recently emphasised, he wants China to buy more American soybeans, and that is entirely feasible. At the same time, the U.S. could consider easing restrictions on China in the semiconductor sector. After all, these restrictions not only affect U.S. firms but also chipmakers in South Korea, Japan, the Netherlands, and elsewhere.
In this light, the consensus to continue suspending the 24 per cent tariffs sends a positive signal. Particularly as Trump prepares to advance peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, he needs tangible economic and trade achievements to showcase progress. Against this backdrop, breakthroughs in U.S.-China economic talks would undoubtedly inject stability into the global landscape and provide the world with a much-needed reassurance.
Lee Bal-zan: In South Korea and Japan, some commentators argue that the tariff war launched by Trump is not only long-lasting, but that most of the so-called “victim countries” are actually U.S. allies, such as South Korea and Japan. By contrast, China, though in a confrontational stance with the United States, appears in some ways to have emerged with relatively better outcomes. Do you think the fundamental reason lies only in differences of power, or are there other factors at play?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I think Trump is a relatively pragmatic leader. He likely believes that in today’s international relations, “power” remains the decisive factor. That is why he has imposed high tariffs on India, the European Union, Japan, and South Korea—economies that, compared with the U.S., still show a clear overall gap in strength. China, however, is in a somewhat different position. This April, after Liberation Day, Trump briefly raised tariffs on Chinese goods to as high as 245 per cent, but he quickly announced exemptions covering $100 billion worth of Chinese products, including smartphones, computers, and semiconductors. These categories are closely tied to U.S. companies’ production in China. Apple and Tesla, for example, depend heavily on China, while roughly 60 per cent of Walmart’s global procurement also originates there.
In addition, the U.S. has repeatedly escalated its chip export controls against China on the grounds of “national security,” which no doubt sets a precedent. In response, China has options to reciprocate“treating others the way they treat you.” For instance, rare earth materials, which are vital for U.S. defence and security industries, could be subject to measured restrictions from China, sending a clear signal. If the two sides fully confront each other in this domain, the U.S. would deeply feel the weight of China’s influence.
At the same time, Trump still seeks to reshape the international order and continue his broader “Make America Great Again” scheme. He does not want excessive pressure on China to undermine his global strategic agenda. After all, he is advancing new initiatives in Canada, Greenland, and Panama; pushing U.S.-led processes in the Middle East; pursuing strategic arrangements in the Caucasus, even brokering a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia; and, of course, aiming to play a central role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. With so many parallel priorities, he cannot afford to make enemies on all fronts at once.
China, as America’s principal “strategic competitor”—at least in Washington’s eyes—may therefore see some restrictions eased, or at least find Trump more willing to reach certain agreements, out of considerations of power and strategy. Such moves reflect Trump’s pragmatism and also serve his larger ambition of reshaping the global economic and trade order.
Lee Bal-zan: So what exactly is Trump trying to reshape? What do you think is the ultimate goal or outcome of this “reshaping”?
Henry Huiyao Wang: Trump’s “reshaping” rests on his belief that the U.S. has been “taken advantage of” under the current international system. In his view, America has been losing out in the international trade order built over nearly 80 years since World War II. He argues that U.S. manufacturing has hollowed out, and that the Midwest and the middle class have suffered severe blows. But these claims are not entirely accurate. In fact, in many ways, the United States has been the biggest beneficiary of the postwar system.
The U.S. still ranks first globally in GDP, with a population of over 300 million and extraordinary natural endowments. Its continental territory stretches between the Atlantic and Pacific, giving it unmatched geographic advantages. The United Nations headquarters is in New York, giving the U.S. unique influence in global governance. Overall, the U.S. has been the primary beneficiary of this system.
Nevertheless, Trump wants to rewrite or even overturn that order in pursuit of a new strategic design. His goal is to shift from multilateralism toward unilateralism, because he believes America still has the power to “do it alone.” In dealing with China, he exercises more caution; with other countries and regions, he feels less constrained. His core aim is “America First”: to maximise U.S. interests and preserve the advantages the country has enjoyed for the past 80 years. In his eyes, America is no longer as comfortably dominant as it once was, so he seeks to craft a new strategy that maximises U.S. gains and ensures America remains at the helm of global affairs.
Lee Bal-zan: Building on what you just mentioned—that China’s overall national strength has risen significantly and now approaches that of the United States—how would you quantify this? From the perspective of political, economic, and diplomatic strength, what percentage of U.S. power would you say China has reached?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I would say that in terms of soft power, China still lags behind the United States. China’s GDP now approaches 70 per cent of America’s, but when it comes to soft power, the U.S. retains clear advantages. For example, English is the global lingua franca, giving the United States a built-in global influence. Many international organisations are headquartered there, with the United Nations in New York being the most prominent example. The U.S. also maintains dominance in global media, news, and publishing, all fundamental pillars of soft power.
That said, it is also important to note that while the U.S. was the primary driver of economic globalisation for much of the past seven or eight decades, that role is increasingly being taken up by China. China’s soft power is now closely linked to its promotion of globalisation and international cooperation. For instance, the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has provided an important complement to the World Bank and the IMF. The Belt and Road Initiative has generated cooperation agreements with more than 150 countries, building a vast network of international economic partnerships. China has also gradually emerged as a leader of the Global South, working alongside India at the core of mechanisms such as BRICS.
BRICS itself is an inclusive economic cooperation platform, essentially an “economic club.” Its membership spans a wide range of governance systems: from India, often described as the “world’s largest democracy,” to monarchies in the Middle East. BRICS does not draw lines along ideological divisions; it focuses squarely on economic cooperation and inclusiveness. Even India and Pakistan can sit at the same table. This model emphasises shared economic benefits and development, offering a new paradigm for international cooperation.
China also plays a proactive and leading role in multilateral engagement. It is part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement. It has also expressed interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Regionally, China has promoted the China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit and invited Gulf states into the ASEAN-GCC-China dialogue framework. Beyond Asia, China has created cooperation forums with Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, and the Arab world, covering nearly all major international cooperation networks.
Taken together, these initiatives highlight how quickly China’s strength has grown in promoting economic globalisation, infrastructure development, and global development.
Lee Bal-zan: Looking ahead, what do you think China will focus on in terms of soft power?
Henry Huiyao Wang: The next step for China is to continue safeguarding and advancing economic globalisation, to build what can be called “Globalisation 2.0.” The post–World War II international order, anchored in the United Nations system over the past 80 years, may be regarded as “Globalisation 1.0.” What China is now promoting represents a transition toward an upgraded “2.0” version.
“Globalisation 2.0” means building on the existing foundations of international cooperation while placing greater emphasis on deepening and expanding economic globalisation, as well as strengthening cultural and people-to-people exchanges. The goal is to foster broader interaction and integration among nations in economic, cultural, and other spheres. As Deng Xiaoping emphasised, “development is the hard truth.” For all developing countries, development remains the most fundamental and urgent task. In this process, China is set to play a pivotal role, serving as a backbone, a centre, and a driving force for the wider developing world.
I believe China is not only setting an example in advancing economic globalisation but is also leading a new round of it. By stimulating development in surrounding countries and across wider regions, and by becoming the leading trading partner for more than 140 countries and regions, China has ample space and opportunities to continue shaping the next stage of global integration.
Lee Bal-zan: The United States seeks to maintain global hegemony. Do you agree with the view that there is now a vacuum in global leadership?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I do not believe there is a vacuum in global leadership. In fact, the world is undergoing a transition from a “unipolar” to a “multipolar” system. What we are witnessing today is the historical process of multipolarisation.
In this multipolar world, beyond the United States, there are also China, the European Union, India, and other major regional powers or regional integration organisations, as well as important economies like the BRICS countries. Together, they are exploring and shaping new systems of global governance. In this transformation, China has demonstrated unique advantages. In promoting economic globalisation and international cooperation, China has often acted ahead of the United States and other nations. At the same time, the U.S. in recent years has scaled back its support for developing countries, even shutting down USAID programs, whereas China has continued to expand its investment and engagement.
From the perspective of global governance and economic cooperation, therefore, China enjoys a notable competitive edge in today’s multipolar landscape.
Part 2. How China Views South Korea
Lee Bal-zan: Let’s turn to some questions about South Korea. Since our newspaper is preparing a special feature on the 80th anniversary of the postwar era, how would you assess South Korea’s development path over the past 80 years? From your perspective as a Chinese expert on global affairs, what is your view?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I would say South Korea’s development has been highly successful. It is one of the most representative success stories of the “Globalisation 1.0” era. After World War II, Western Europe achieved rapid growth under the Marshall Plan. Following the Korean War, both South Korea and Japan began their fast development, while after the Vietnam War, the Asian “Four Tigers” quickly rose. In this context, South Korea benefited greatly from the new postwar order and the early opportunities of globalisation.
Part of South Korea’s success came from not having to shoulder excessive defence costs, since it benefited from the U.S. security umbrella. Another decisive factor was its establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1992. At that time, South Korea’s leadership showed considerable creativity in foreign policy, including its handling of the Taiwan question. This diplomatic strategy allowed South Korea to tap into China’s vast market on one side, while also drawing on advanced technology and resources from Europe and the United States. As a result, South Korea found itself in a highly advantageous position for growth.
Thanks to this, South Korea’s economy advanced rapidly, becoming one of the few Asian countries to join the ranks of developed nations and a member of the OECD. Its path of development is often cited as a model success story in Asia.
Of course, South Korea now faces a number of challenges: demographic ageing, geopolitical tensions, the North-South conflict, and the delicate task of managing relations with China. These factors place the country at a critical crossroads, where it must carefully balance ties with its neighbours, particularly economic and diplomatic relations with its largest trading partner.
Culturally and historically, South Korea belongs to the Confucian cultural sphere and is part of the East Asian civilisation, sharing deep-rooted ties and similarities with China. Looking ahead, South Korea’s future development will remain closely linked to China’s vast market and stable relations. This connection will be vital both for South Korea’s economic prospects and for maintaining regional stability.
Lee Bal-zan: Since 2018, as U.S.-China relations have grown more strained, how has South Korea’s international position and role changed from China’s perspective?
Henry Huiyao Wang: The situation can be described this way: from South Korea’s standpoint, the deployment of the THAAD system some years ago triggered deep dissatisfaction and protest from China. South Korea must carefully navigate the geopolitical realities of dealing with major powers. On the one hand, it hosts U.S. troops on its soil; on the other, it faces the nuclear threat from North Korea. Against this backdrop, maintaining a stable and constructive relationship with China is of critical importance. In a sense, South Korea would be well served by pursuing a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy.
In recent years, China–South Korea relations have gone through ups and downs. A relatively positive example came when President Yoon Suk Yeol declined to meet with Nancy Pelosi during her controversial visit to Taiwan. Since taking office, President Lee Jae Myun has also reiterated the importance of pursuing “pragmatic diplomacy” toward China, which is another encouraging sign. South Korea needs to remain clear-eyed about where its largest market lies: China is its biggest trading partner. For the sake of national interest and economic growth, preserving stable ties with China is indispensable.
On the North Korean issue, South Korea should take further steps to promote reconciliation on the peninsula. The new administration has floated some fresh policy ideas, which are positive signals. First and foremost, all provocative military actions should be halted, while efforts should be made to build a more durable peace mechanism. Since the Korean Peninsula is still technically in a state of armistice, it would be worth considering a formal peace agreement under the original Panmunjom framework, signed by the United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea, to ensure denuclearisation and advance peace.
Overall, South Korea plays a pivotal role in maintaining regional stability, promoting North–South reconciliation, and managing China-U.S. relations. With an active and steady diplomatic approach, the country can reduce risks and secure both its development and the security of the region.
Lee Bal-zan: What role do you think China can play in advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I think China can play a very important role. As a neighbour of North Korea, China accounts for the majority of Pyongyang’s trade and economic exchanges. Historically, too, ties run deep—during the Korean War, China sent hundreds of thousands of volunteers to support North Korea. This legacy underpins the enduring traditional bond between the two sides.
Today, South Korea is also economically intertwined with China, and Beijing has significant leverage when it comes to mediation. Recent examples show China’s effectiveness in conflict resolution: brokering reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, easing tensions between Cambodia and Thailand, and helping mend relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. These precedents demonstrate that China is fully capable of facilitating peace talks within a Panmunjom-based four-party framework, opening the way toward a new peace arrangement for the Korean Peninsula.
This is especially relevant now, as the U.S. president has expressed interest in advancing regional peace and meeting both South Korean and North Korean leaders. China has successfully chaired the Six-Party Talks in the past and helped achieve UN Security Council resolutions. It is entirely feasible for China to help relaunch four-party negotiations under UN auspices to push the peace process forward.
Lee Bal-zan: Why reduce the Six-Party Talks to a Four-Party framework?
Henry Huiyao Wang: By “four parties,” I mean the original signatories of the Panmunjom Agreement. That framework is still valid today and could be used again.
Lee Bal-zan: Recently, South Korea’s new foreign minister, Cho Hyun, said in an interview with the Washington Post that China is “becoming somewhat problematic with its neighbours.” What is your view of this remark? And given that it came after the new South Korean administration took office, what does such a sensitive statement suggest for China?
Henry Huiyao Wang: That remark reflects a clear misunderstanding and a lack of nuanced knowledge about China. In fact, it contains many misreadings and misjudgments. China today is one of the most important forces for peace globally. Whether in mediating regional conflicts or in other areas, China has consistently acted as a stabilising “ballast stone.” It has become an essential anchor for global and regional economic stability, while also maintaining close ties with other nations and serving as many countries’ largest trading partner.
As for the issues Cho Hyun alluded to, these likely involve the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. On such matters, China has its own positions and reasons rooted in defending national sovereignty. To conflate these disputes with China’s overall neighbourhood policy is inaccurate. From a South Korean perspective, such statements lack responsibility and do little to support the stability or healthy development of China–South Korea relations.
Lee Bal-zan: Understood. In terms of economics, technology, and security, what do you see as China’s strategic priorities toward South Korea? Not only economically, but also from a security perspective.
Henry Huiyao Wang: China’s foreign policy has been consistent and coherent. As early as the Bandung Conference several decades ago, China articulated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and that concept remains a cornerstone of Chinese diplomacy today. As a close neighbour with deep historical ties and cultural affinities, including what might be called a shared “chopstick culture,” South Korea has a natural foundation for mutual trust and cooperation with China.
South Korea’s strengths in high technology, particularly semiconductors and advanced manufacturing, complement China’s vast market. Healthy China–South Korea relations not only ensure steady long-term economic growth for both sides, but also foster people-to-people exchange and contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Good China–South Korea relations also create conditions for further progress in inter-Korean relations, which could bring more lasting peace to the peninsula.
From a geopolitical perspective, China is the peninsula’s largest neighbour and principal economic partner. South Korea, therefore, needs to manage relations with China with particular care. At the same time, because U.S. troops remain stationed in South Korea, the country must maintain strategic neutrality, focusing on developing economic and social exchanges rather than aligning too closely with any specific military bloc. During the Biden administration, South Korea joined the so-called Camp David Summit with the U.S. and Japan, forming a small-circle security alliance. Such moves are unfavourable for China–South Korea relations and deserve attention.
Overall, as China’s influence, capacity for economic cooperation, and soft power continue to expand, South Korea, while keeping normal relations with other major powers, should attach great importance to friendly cooperation with China. This is a matter that requires special attention and careful handling.
Lee Bal-zan: In the past, China–South Korea economic cooperation was particularly close, largely because of market complementarities. But now, in areas like science and technology, especially high-tech industries, the two countries are also competitors, and in some sectors, China is even seen as having pulled ahead. In this context, how can South Korea continue to benefit from cooperation with China and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I think there is still a great deal South Korea can do to strengthen cooperation with China. First, South Korea has historically had a very large number of students studying in China—at its peak, tens of thousands, more than from any other country. This is an area where the two sides can deepen cooperation. Korean and Chinese companies could also work together to expand into third-country markets, including Latin America, Africa, ASEAN, Central Asia, and the Middle East. South Korea’s capabilities in these regions can complement China’s outreach.
Second, South Korea’s tourism industry remains very strong, and it is one of the most popular destinations for Chinese tourists. The inflow of Chinese visitors brings significant services trade revenue, which carries important economic value for South Korea.
Third, maintaining positive relations with China will also bring political and security dividends for South Korea. In the past, South Korea benefited economically from cooperation with China; in the future, it will also benefit from China’s role in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, helping to prevent potential conflict. China’s coordinating role in inter-Korean peace matters is crucial to South Korea’s security.
From a historical perspective, China was a signatory to the Panmunjom Armistice Agreement, and good relations with China have never been to South Korea’s detriment. On the contrary, they have delivered long-term benefits. South Korea should not measure cooperation with China purely in terms of trade volumes, but rather in a comprehensive way, including cultural exchange, student programs, and joint ventures in third-country markets. In regional trade cooperation, South Korea has expressed interest in joining the CPTPP, while China has also shown willingness. Under the RCEP framework, both countries can further advance the building of a China–Japan–South Korea free trade zone, where South Korea could play a significant role.
In addition, South Korea has already demonstrated leadership in promoting regional cooperation through the China–Japan–South Korea trilateral mechanism. It can continue to play that positive role in the future. The scope for cooperation is wide-ranging: maintaining good relations with China will not only generate economic benefits but will also support political stability, security, and regional peace. This is an effort worth pursuing further.
Lee Bal-zan: You just mentioned the North Korea issue and the Six-Party Talks. After the signing of the September 19 Joint Statement, there was a more concrete articulation of the goal of denuclearisation of North Korea, as well as commitments to dismantle nuclear facilities. However, those promises were never carried out, and the process eventually stalled. At this point, North Korea has effectively become a de facto nuclear-armed state.
In your view, what were the main problems with the Six-Party Talks model?
Henry Huiyao Wang: The Six-Party Talks were actually quite successful at the time. They laid the groundwork for subsequent UN Security Council resolutions, as all parties agreed that the Korean Peninsula should remain denuclearised. Both China and the United States voted in favour, which directly led to sanctions on North Korea. The process also paved the way for later high-level meetings between U.S. President Donald Trump and the North Korean leader. In this sense, the Six-Party Talks played a critical role in building consensus.
The problem was that the talks did not continue. Because of regional tensions, changes of administration in the U.S., and political shifts in South Korea and Japan, there was no continuous mechanism to ensure implementation. China, however, maintained a consistent and stable policy throughout.
Given that the current U.S. president is actively promoting regional peace, China could work with the United States to push forward reconciliation and eventual reunification on the Korean Peninsula. With South Korea’s new president, Lee Jae-myung, also signalling a willingness to adopt a more proactive diplomacy, favourable conditions exist for peace. China could serve as a key player in fostering reconciliation.
It is therefore entirely possible to build on the original four-party Panmunjom framework, revisit the armistice, and transform it into a peace treaty, thereby launching a new peace process on the Korean Peninsula, with China, the United States, and the two Koreas all participating. If such a process were to succeed, the benefits for South Korea would be considerable: the peninsula could emerge as a unified market of 70 to 80 million people, generating economic, political, and social dividends. Without question, this would represent a major strategic opportunity for South Korea’s future development.
Part 3. Commemorating the Victory in World War II and Shared Historical Memory
Lee Bal-zan: In China, commemorations take place on September 3. South Korea is among the very few countries that mark this anniversary alongside China. Do you believe it would be significant for China if South Korea’s new president, Lee Jae-myung, were to attend this year’s commemoration?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I think it would be very important, and China would welcome such participation. Ten years ago, former South Korean President Park Geun-hye also came to Beijing for China’s military parade. The symbolism is strong, as China and South Korea share the historical memory of the 80th anniversary of victory in the anti-fascist war. These commemorations attract many world leaders, and as a close neighbour, South Korea has every reason to take part.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is also expected to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit on the eve of the parade in China, even if he does not take part in the parade itself. His participation underscores an effort to demonstrate strategic autonomy from the United States and pursue greater independence in foreign policy.
For President Lee Jae-myung, personally attending China’s commemoration would not only underscore South Korea’s renewed reflection on Japan’s wartime history but also help advance peace in Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia, by fostering a more unified regional voice. In my view, the South Korean president must participate, and such a gesture would certainly be warmly received by China.
Lee Bal-zan: The concern, however, is that leaders such as President Lee Jae-myung may weigh historical experience. A decade ago, after President Park Geun-hye visited China, the United States reacted to Seoul’s growing closeness with Beijing, triggering a series of follow-up events. This time, when deciding whether to participate, President Lee may also take into account Washington’s attitude and the potential consequences. In this context, South Korea’s choice and situation appear quite complex. How do you assess this situation?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I don’t think it should be a major concern. Today, every country should exercise a certain degree of strategic autonomy. India, for example, maintains good relations with the United States but still chooses to visit China. By the same logic, South Korea, as China’s close neighbour, has every reason to take part in Chinese activities or visit China. Such exchanges represent reconciliation and interaction between nations. They should not be confined to visits to Washington alone, nor to Beijing alone. As a middle power, South Korea ought to maintain its own independence.
Moreover, these events also reflect history and shared memory. During World War II, China and South Korea fought together against Japanese fascism. That is a shared historical legacy, and participation in such commemorations carries significant meaning.
I would add that this has little to do with whether Trump might be petty-minded. Compared with Biden, Trump places greater emphasis on economic cooperation rather than geopolitical alliances. His reassessment of arrangements such as the AUKUS shows that he is less inclined to push multinational alliances than his predecessor, focusing instead on economic gains. If Trump returns to an economy-centred policy track, it may not necessarily be a bad thing for China. This would mean countries could engage in rational, healthy economic competition and cooperation, learning from each other’s management and development experiences, and contributing more to the world. From this perspective, South Korea stands to gain significantly by maintaining a balanced approach to both China and the United States.
Lee Bal-zan: You mentioned a process of “reconciliation and cooperation.” Could you elaborate?
Henry Huiyao Wang: Yes. What I mean is that South Korea needs to be more engaged in the process of managing U.S.–China relations. The commemoration of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan is also an important moment for reflection—“remembering the past to guide the future.” China and South Korea share many experiences and understandings here, with plenty of common ground. These can be harnessed to better manage both China–South Korea relations and, at the same time, China–U.S. relations. South Korea can act as a bridge, a go-between, and help improve and advance relations between Beijing and Washington. That role is entirely possible.
Lee Bal-zan: You just mentioned that South Korea may play a role in improving U.S.–China relations. But what signal would it send to China if Seoul were instead to draw closer to Japan?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I believe China, South Korea, and Japan should all move closer together and deepen cooperation. After all, the three countries are in Northeast Asia, part of the East Asian cultural sphere, sharing a “chopstick culture” as well as deep roots in Buddhism, literature, language, and historical tradition. The three should forge tighter bonds and eventually extend regional cooperation to include ASEAN, perhaps even exploring the creation of an Asian currency and forming an “Asian Union” akin to the EU. Within this framework, China, Japan, and South Korea could take on a leadership role, with ASEAN countries also participating.
This would be a highly promising direction. Asia’s weight in the global economy is set to keep rising—today Asia accounts for about 50 per cent of global GDP, and this may reach 60 to 70 per cent in the future. Against that backdrop, major Asian economies such as China, Japan, South Korea, and eventually India can work together. At this stage, efforts should focus on building a Northeast Asia Free Trade Zone and integrating a Northeast Asia–Southeast Asia economic bloc, gradually shaping an open and free regional trade and cooperation mechanism—what could be called an “Asian Union.”
Such an approach would foster good-neighbourliness and strengthen regional cooperation, which is vital for future peace and development. It is also noteworthy that in recent decades, Asia has seen few large-scale wars (apart from smaller clashes such as the recent Cambodia–Thailand dispute), giving both a historical and practical foundation for integration. China, Japan, and South Korea should be thinking seriously about how to better collaborate within the region and jointly lead the next stage of Asia’s economic integration.
Lee Bal-zan: You just mentioned the idea of an Asian currency. Are you referring to something like a unified monetary system similar to the euro, or do you have other designs in mind?
Henry Huiyao Wang: Yes, why not consider an Asian currency? I believe this is entirely possible. If Asia’s economy develops to a sufficient level, the region could certainly have its own currency—a unified Asian monetary system. Both in theory and in practice, such a system is feasible.
Lee Bal-zan: Looking ahead, in the context of China–South Korea cooperation, what would you identify as China’s non-negotiable red lines in foreign policy? Could you give some concrete examples?
Henry Huiyao Wang: There are several points worth noting. First and foremost is the Taiwan question. Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, a fact that is widely recognised. Second, South Korea should avoid adopting a one-sided diplomatic strategy. Given its geographic position, deep economic interdependence with China, and its unique relationship with North Korea, Seoul cannot afford to take a unilateral stance—it must strike a balance among all parties.
Maintaining this balance is crucial, whether in managing relations with the United States, with China, or with Japan. South Korea should avoid being locked into a trilateral U.S.–Japan–Korea military alliance or engaging in overly one-sided joint military exercises.
It is also important to remember that China remains South Korea’s largest trading partner. Bilateral relations should be further deepened. Recently, South Korea’s decision to grant temporary visa-free entry to Chinese tour groups was a positive step. Looking forward, Seoul could also consider easing visa restrictions for individual Chinese travellers and expanding opportunities for Chinese students to study in South Korea, while also encouraging more South Koreans to study in China. Such measures would foster greater practical cooperation between the two countries.
In summary, the fundamental red line in diplomacy is not to infringe on each other’s core interests. That, I believe, is the most important principle.
Part 4. Leadership Dynamics and Future Outlook
Lee Bal-zan: Understood. You also mentioned that the APEC Leaders’ Informal Dialogue will soon be held in Gyeongju, South Korea. This will be an important opportunity for Chinese and Korean leaders to meet. What issues do you expect the two sides to focus on in such a face-to-face meeting? What impact might these discussions have on the future of China–South Korea relations?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I think this is indeed very significant. With South Korea hosting this year’s APEC Leaders’ Informal Dialogue, the event itself provides an excellent opportunity. Looking back at last year’s APEC meeting in Lima, there was even a U.S.–China leaders’ summit. This year, Seoul may play an important role in facilitating another such meeting. As host, the South Korean leader’s engagement with the Chinese leader would also highlight Korea’s diplomatic strengths—its neutrality, fairness, and ability to maintain balance—and could help foster more constructive regional relations.
Historically, APEC has achieved remarkable results, advancing many forms of cooperation among member economies. As the forum has grown into a central platform for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, its leaders’ meetings remain highly influential in driving integration. Notably, APEC includes China, Chinese Taipei, and Hong Kong, which demonstrates its unique value in bridging differences and fostering regional cooperation. I would even suggest that South Korea could consider inviting North Korea to participate, using APEC as a breakthrough to promote reconciliation on the peninsula, and potentially convening a four-party meeting involving China, the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea on the sidelines.
On the economic agenda, advancing Asia-Pacific integration remains a key objective. While frameworks such as RCEP and CPTPP are already in place, APEC proposed the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) many years ago. In my view, building a comprehensive pan-Asia-Pacific free trade area should be a central topic at this year’s APEC meeting. Such an initiative would not only help counter the challenges of unilateralism and protectionism but also serve the shared interests of South Korea, China, Japan, the EU, and others in pursuing deeper trade integration. Upholding Asia-Pacific integration and advancing free trade will, I believe, be defining themes of this year’s APEC discussions.
Lee Bal-zan: South Korea has long expressed some concerns about Asian economic integration, mainly regarding the influence of Chinese standards. As a major power in Asia, China carries significant weight in standard-setting, and its supply chains dominate many sectors—factors that naturally draw South Korea’s attention. In addition, Seoul’s security and geopolitical ties with Western countries have, to some extent, constrained its participation in regional integration. Taken together, these factors shape Korea’s hesitation toward deeper integration in Asia.
Given these concerns, what persuasive arguments should China put forward to help South Korea better understand and feel willing to participate in this integration process?
Henry Huiyao Wang: If South Korea wishes to demonstrate leadership, APEC is an excellent opportunity, since the role of host comes only once in many years. In this regard, I don’t think South Korea needs to be overly worried. The United States has created many globally accepted standards; Europe has also set important international standards. Now, with China’s development, new standards have naturally emerged. For instance, in green energy, clean-energy vehicles, solar power, and photovoltaics, China has introduced new benchmarks, and in the future, it may also set standards in fields such as 5G and 6G. As long as these standards are open and globally friendly, they can be adopted. Standards should not be rejected simply because they originate in China, nor should they be divided along ideological lines. This is precisely the direction that should be further encouraged.
At the same time, my emphasis on the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific stems from the fact that its creation would necessarily be consensus-driven. The process would involve the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and others—no single country could dominate. Through negotiation, it is possible to establish new standards that all sides can accept, thereby advancing Asia-Pacific integration. There are already precedents for this. RCEP, for instance, was concluded after many years of negotiations and includes ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. There is also CPTPP, a higher-standard agreement covering investment and other areas, which the EU, China, and Korea could also join in the future to drive regional cooperation.
From this perspective, the APEC summit offers South Korea an excellent platform to showcase its ability to shape the agenda and exercise summit leadership. This is a highly valuable opportunity.
Lee Bal-zan: On a related note, if China’s top leader were to visit Korea during this summit, it would be the first visit in 11 years. For South Korea, such a visit would carry enormous significance and is already generating high expectations. Beyond the topics related to international multilateral organisations and mechanisms that you just mentioned, what other issues do you think the two leaders might discuss during a bilateral meeting? And what major impact could these discussions have on the future of China–South Korea relations, given that this would be a direct leader-to-leader exchange?
Henry Huiyao Wang: The significance of such a visit cannot be overstated. As you mentioned, it could be the first visit by China’s top leader to Korea in more than a decade—that is one important aspect. Another is that South Korea has just gone through a political transition and now has a pragmatic new president. This creates a clear need for a new narrative in China–South Korea relations.
At present, many countries are improving their relations with China. Leaders from India and various European states have recently visited, as have those from Latin America, ASEAN, and neighbouring countries such as Vietnam. Against this backdrop, China and South Korea need to construct a new narrative: as close neighbours with deep historical ties and long-standing cultural traditions, they share the heritage of East Asian civilisation, are both part of the Confucian cultural sphere, and even reflect common traits such as the “chopstick culture.” A leaders’ summit provides a valuable opportunity to dispel mutual suspicion, rebuild trust, and strengthen confidence in the bilateral relationship.
For example, the release of a photo of the two leaders shaking hands, or the issuance of a new joint communiqué, could reaffirm both sides’ positions, advancing denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula and promoting regional peace. China can play an active role in mediation and dialogue. At the same time, in terms of economic cooperation, China and South Korea could further strengthen cooperation on issues such as the CPTPP and broader Asia-Pacific economic integration.
China and South Korea could also expand people-to-people and cultural exchanges in the context of third-party cooperation. Korean dramas, for instance, once enjoyed immense popularity in China, and this kind of cultural resonance could be reactivated and elevated to new heights. A high-level summit provides an opportunity to realise these goals, which could generate tangible and positive outcomes.
Lee Bal-zan: My second-to-last question is about the book The Clash of Civilisations. In it, the author identifies China as the core of the Sinic world. Do you think the present era validates some of the book’s arguments? For example, could U.S.–China competition be understood as a structural struggle between Western civilisation and the Sinosphere? From this perspective, which parts do you agree with, and which do you reject?
Henry Huiyao Wang: I believe that while differences between civilisations certainly exist, they do not inevitably lead to war. Chinese civilisation is an extensive and profound tradition with an unbroken history of more than 5,000 years. It originated in the agrarian societies of the Yangtze and Yellow River basins, where stability, careful cultivation, and orderly management of land shaped values emphasising order and harmony.
This cultural foundation nurtured a philosophy of peace, expressed in the idea that “harmony is most precious.” Historically, when Admiral Zheng He sailed to the Western Seas—long before Columbus reached the Americas—he did not pursue colonial expansion. China’s rise has never implied a quest for hegemony; the Western notion that “a strong nation must dominate” does not apply to the Chinese cultural tradition. Today, China promotes economic globalisation and initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, encouraging mutual interdependence. The concept of “you are in me, and I am in you” makes a full-scale China-U.S. trade confrontation unworkable, reflecting instead the value of cooperation and inclusiveness among civilisations.
From this perspective, the breadth of East Asian and Chinese civilisation should be celebrated, while also recognising the strengths and values of Western civilisation. The world has entered an era of peaceful competition, where differences among civilisations are no longer addressed through conquest or force. In the context of nuclear deterrence, the destructiveness of war makes direct conflict almost unthinkable, so competition must be constructive, primarily in economic and cultural spheres.
China has demonstrated clear strengths in this competition. At the same time, the broader East Asian region, including South Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries, also forms part of the East Asian civilisational sphere. The positive elements of this shared heritage should be leveraged to prevent conflict and war, and to foster regional cooperation. At the heart of Chinese civilisation lies a culture of peace, and it is on this foundation that the present era should be understood and peaceful competition between civilisations and nations achieved.
From a military perspective, even China’s parade reflects this principle. They are not intended merely as displays of force, but as demonstrations of self-defence and resilience, signalling that China does not seek conflict, but is prepared to respond to potential threats. This underpins the sustainability of peaceful competition. In the current era, competition should be understood as peaceful competition, civilisational competition, and economic competition. East Asian countries should work together for shared development.
Lee Bal-zan: Finally, do you have a message for South Korea about its next 80 years, or is there anything you would like to add that we haven’t yet discussed? Please feel free to share your thoughts.
Henry Huiyao Wang: Yes. I believe South Korea is a highly meaningful example for Asia. Since World War II, it has been one of the fastest-growing countries in the region and among the few to enter the ranks of developed nations, second only to Japan. It also possesses a rich culture and a long history. Historically, relations between China and South Korea have been generally positive, and as close neighbours, the two should continue to deepen cultural exchange and cooperation.
At present, South Korea faces the critical challenge of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Looking ahead, it should work more closely with both China and the United States to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and achieve peace and eventual reunification on the peninsula. I see this as the most important direction for China–South Korea cooperation, and the most vital task for South Korea’s future. My message to South Korea is therefore this: I hope that four-party talks can proceed smoothly, laying the groundwork for a sustainable peace framework on the Korean Peninsula and ensuring long-term regional stability and prosperity.
Lee Bal-zan: Thank you! This interview lasted exactly one hour. I truly appreciate your time and cooperation.
Henry Huiyao Wang: Thank you very much.
Lee Bal-zan: I look forward to seeing you again at the next event.
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